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The Impact of European Union Membership on Levels of Corruption 
I. Introduction 
 
On October 4, 2009, the PASOK (Socialist) Party of Greece was ushered into power with the 
election of their candidate, George Papandreou, as prime minister. Two months later, the new 
PASOK Government announced that the projected budget deficit for 2009 was 12.7% of GDP, 
double the old 2009 deficit estimate of 6.7% of GDP and over 9 percentage points above the 3% 
deficit-to-GDP ratio allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact for Eurozone member countries.1 
The 12.7% estimate was later adjusted upward to 15.4%,2 and by early 2010, several credit-rating 
agencies had re-classified Greece’s sovereign debt to “junk status.”3 Over the next few years, the 
financial crisis in Greece became increasingly dire as Greece received 242.8 billion euros in loans 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU), underwent the largest 
debt restructuring in history, and became the first developed nation to default on the IMF.45 
While the reasons for the debt crisis in Greece are disparate and complex, the widespread 
presence of corruption in Greece has been noted as a factor that contributed to the situation.6 
Nelson, Belkin, and Mix acknowledge that the decrease in borrowing rates with the Greek adoption 
of the Euro, the investor confidence inspired by Greek ratification of the Stability and Growth 
                                                          
1 “Papandreou Tries to Prop Up the Pillars” The Economist, Dec 17th 2009. Retrieved January 2, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15127474/print. 
2 Helena Smith, “Greek Deficit Much Bigger than Estimate,” The Guardian, November 15, 2010, Retrieved 
December 27, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/nov/15/greek-deficit-bigger-than-thought. 
3 Chavon Sutton, “S&P downgrades Greek debt to junk,” CNN Money, April 27, 2010, Retrieved January 14, 2016, 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/27/news/international/Greece_debt_downgraded/. 
4 “Timeline: Greece's Debt Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, Retrieved December 30, 2015, 
http://www.cfr.org/greece/timeline-greeces-debt-crisis/p36451 
5 Alexander Saeedy and John O’Donnell, “How much Greece owes to international creditors,” Reuter,. June 28, 
2015, Retrieved January 23, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-debt-factbox-
idUSKCN0P80XW20150628. 
6 Nicos Christodoulakis, (2010), "Crisis, threats and ways out for the greek economy," Cyprus Economic Policy 
Review 4, no. 1 .89-90. 
Pact, as well as the government borrowing to pay for budget deficits and net imports, were all 
important elements resulting in the Greek Crisis.7 Nelson et al. also emphasize, however, the 
impact of the “deeply entrenched” corruption in the Greek economy and Greek society in the form 
of “…a large and inefficient public administration, endemic tax evasion, and widespread political 
clientelism.”8 
The issue of widespread corruption, unfortunately, is not limited to Greece alone. In her 
2014 Anti-Corruption Report to the European Council and the European Parliament, E.U. Trade 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström stated that “the extent of [corruption] in Europe is breathtaking” 
and costing the E.U. economy “at least €120 billion annually (equivalent to $162 billion).”910 The 
data describes reports of high levels of corruption in Eastern European members and relatively 
new E.U. members, such as Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania.11 Indications 
of high corruption, however, were also seen in founding E.U. members, such as Spain, Portugal, 
Italy, and Ireland.12 
These findings question the anti-corruption efficacy of European Union institutions and 
guidelines. All applicant nations wishing to accede to the E.U. must adopt anti-corruption 
legislation and practices, establish “watchdog” institutions, and demonstrate an acceptable level 
                                                          
7 R. M. Nelson, P. Belkin, & D. E. Mix, (2011), Greece’s Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses and 
Implications, Journal of Current Issues in Finance, Business and Economics, (4), 373.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Chris Morris, “Corruption across E.U. 'breathtaking' - E.U. Commission.” BBC News, Brussels. February 3, 2014. 
Retrieved December 2, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26014387. 
10 E.U. Commission. "Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament–EU Anti-Corruption 
Report." (2014). 
11 Ibid, 14. 
12 Ibid. 
of transparency in government operations.13 The 2014 E.U. Commission Anti-Corruption Report 
acknowledges this when it states: 
EU Member States have in place most of the necessary legal 
instruments and institutions to prevent and fight corruption. 
However, the results they deliver are not satisfactory across the. EU. 
Anti-corruption rules are not always vigorously enforced, systemic 
problems are not tackled effectively enough, and the relevant 
institutions do not always have sufficient capacity to enforce the 
rules. Declared intentions are still too distant from concrete results, 
and genuine political will to eradicate corruption often appears to be 
missing.14 
The report details the impact of these shortcomings with a few notable statistics. For 
example, 26% of E.U. citizens surveyed reported that they are personally affected by corruption.15 
Furthermore, 73% of those surveyed indicated that a bribe or connection was the best way to obtain 
a public service and only 23% thought that their government was effectively addressing 
corruption.16 
Corruption costs the E.U. economy in a variety of ways, and the estimated loss due to 
corruption (€120 billion) is only a little less than the 2014 agreed E.U. budget of €145 billion 
(estimated in 2015 figures).17 The main costs come through the loss of tax revenues and foreign 
investment.1819 It is important to note that the tax revenue and foreign investment loss factored not 
only in the Greek Crises, but also in the developing debt crises in Ireland and Portugal in 2009 that 
                                                          
13 Paul Craig, "The Treaty of Lisbon: Process, Architecture and Substance," European Law Review 2 (2008): 147. 
14 E.U. Commission Anti-Corruption Report (2014), 2. 
15 Ibid, 7. 
16 Ibid. 
17 “2014 Budget.” European Union. Retrieved January 14, 2016. http://europa.eu/pol/financ/index_en.htm 
18 E.U. Commission Anti-Corruption Report (2014), 3. 
19 Additionally, the report states that a third of firms engaged in public tenders for government contracts were 
unable to participate due to corruption, in some cases raising costs as high as 50% of the cost of the original 
contract. See Arnáiz, Teresa Medina. (2008) "The Exclusion of Tenderers in Public Procurement as an Anti-
Corruption Mean,” 2.  
spread to Spain and Italy in 2012.20  Given the global ramifications of the Greek Crisis, as well as 
the impact of the E.U. economy of the common market, it is imperative that the E.U. effectively 
address and lower the incidence of corruption among its members. 
The ostensible aim of the European Union is to improve the quality of life for the citizens of 
the member countries. The treaties and agreements made amongst the members are crafted to allow 
Europeans to enjoy greater economic prosperity and political stability through improved and 
streamlined governmental processes within the union. The governing documents of the European 
Union commits the organization to transparency and ethical practices in government operations, 
as explicitly stated and detailed in the 11th article of the 2007 Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union.21 The continued instances of corruption are counter to the codified aims of the 
E.U. as well as the official efforts to eradicate corruption that E.U. institutions and member states 
are required to undertake. The goal of this study is to empirically determine the effect of E.U. 
membership on levels of corruption, as the legitimacy of the E.U.’s mission to raise the living 
standards of Europeans rests in part with the efficacy of E.U. anti-corruption measures. As the 
recent debt crises suggest, the benefit of E.U. membership in terms of addressing corrupt 
governance—and the resultant financial emergencies—may not be as robust and effective as it 
should be.  
II. Previous Literature 
 
The literature on the subject of economic factors of corruption is extensive, so I confined my 
literature review to recent papers and research that aided me in building my model. I was unable 
                                                          
20 The Eurozone Crisis: Overview and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2012. 
21 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, The Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001- 0390. Retrieved April 10, 2017. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012M/TXT 
to find many other papers that examined the specific role of European Union membership on levels 
of corruption in a country. Thus, I focused on examining research that would aid in identifying 
necessary independent variables.  
Wijaynato Wijayanto (2007) authored the paper that directly influenced this study and the 
development of the regression used to determine the impact of E.U. membership on corruption. 
His paper, titled “Economic, Political and Social Factors Affecting Corruption: A Cross Country 
Analysis,” incorporates most of the scholarship and sources later discussed in this paper and used 
in the construction of this study’s regression. Wijaynato’s paper is unique in that includes two 
variables, quality of regulation and urban population, which have never been used in any previous 
studies. This paper was part of his dissertation at Georgetown University for his Masters in Public 
Policy. He uses World Bank data from 133 countries around the world for five years, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004. Wijayanto states that high-quality regulation created by a government can act 
as an anticorruption mechanism, given that efficient regulation allows a country to function more 
effectively.22 In addition, the proportion of urban population may also have positive relationship 
with control of corruption, as urban citizens tend to be better educated and more involved in civic 
activity.23 Wijayanto, however, found that the urban population variable was not significant.24 
Daniel Treisman (2000) finds that effective, efficient democracy strengthens the control of 
corruption score, as a result of limiting corruption-inducing behavior in public officials.25 This 
article analyzes various factors that could be related to levels of "perceived corruption.” He 
                                                          
22 Wijaynato Wijaynato, (2007) “Economic, Political and Social Factors Affecting Corruption: A Cross Country 
Analysis,” PhD diss., Georgetown University , 4. Accessed January 4, 2016. DigitalGeorgetown Institutional 
Repository, Available at http://hdl.handle.net/10822/555845. 
23 Ibid, 5. 
24 Ibid, 31. 
25 D. Treisman, (June 2000), “The Cause of Corruption – Cross Country Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 76 
(3), 341. 
compiled his data from business risk surveys for the early-1980s and mid-1990s. His main findings 
were Countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, more developed economies, and 
more effective democracies were rated “less corrupt.”26 
Lindita Camaj (2012) finds that press freedom and democracy strengthen each other, and that 
this is particularly the case when press freedom exists in the framework of what the author defines 
as a “strong civil society.” She measures the relationship between media freedom and corruption, 
dividing the media’s role into what she defines as vertical accountability (electoral 
competitiveness, civil society, and voter turnout) and horizontal accountability (judicial 
independence and political system).27 She finds a positive relationship between democracy quality 
and transparency. Her results also suggest a strong association between high levels of media 
freedom with low levels of corruption.28 
In addition, Amos Brunetti and Bruno Weder (1999) reinforce  Camaj’s findings and their data 
also suggest that the association between media freedom and corruption is stronger in countries 
with parliamentary systems than in those with presidential systems. They also find that this impact 
amplifies as the degree of judiciary independence increases.29 Both Brunetti and Weder and Camaj 
utilize two decades of Press Freedom data from Freedom house. 
Press freedom enables media to publish balanced news about the government, including 
news about corruption by government officers. A strong and viable Press creates accountability 
                                                          
26 ibid, 453.  
27 Lindita Camaj, (2012), "The Media’s Role in Fighting Corruption: Media Effects on Governmental 
Accountability," The International Journal of Press/Politics. 1940161212462741. 
28 ibid, 13.  
 29 A. Brunetti and B. Weder, (2003), “A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption,” Journal of Public Economics, 87 (8), 
1801-1810. 
source for the general public. This is in line with Klitgaard’s (1999) statement in his book, 
Controlling Corruption, that corruption levels increase with a government-dominated media and 
decrease when an un-censored press focuses on government accountability.30 
Fatic Aleksandar (2000) finds that stability is an important factor in determining whether 
the national environment is conducive to corruption or not.31 Stable political, economic and 
social elements allow the government and the citizens to create and perpetuate transparent 
mechanisms of corruption monitoring, assessment, and control.32 Aleksandar continues with 
findings indicating that corruption is rampant in countries in Southeast Europe that underwent 
political transition.33 Aleksandar states that this transition is accompanied by political, economic 
and social instability. Situations of instability may make corruption the only available option for 
citizens, including government officers, to survive.34 Reading from Aleksandar’s analysis 
indicates that political stability may have positive relationship with the control of corruption.35 
James Rauch and Peter Evans (2000) conducted a study on bureaucratic quality and 
corruption.36 They look at how the recruitment and promotion process in the bureaucracy is 
based on meritocracy or on nepotism, as they argue that less nepotism tends to reduce the 
collusion and power abuse among bureaucrats.37 They test this point by constructing an index of 
                                                          
30 R. Klitgaard, (1991). Controlling Corruption. California: University of California Press. 
31 Fatic Aleksandar (2000), Stability and Corruption in South Eastern Europe – Corruption is a way of life in South-





36 James E Rauch and Peter B. Evans, (1999), “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less 
Developed Countries,” UC San Diego: Department of Economics, Retrieved from: 
http://eprints.cdlib.org/uc/item/0sb0w38d 
37 ibid, 9. 
meritocratic recruitment and promotion. They show that it is significantly associated with 
corruption in their sample of less developed countries.38 
Carlos Liete and Jens Weidmann (1999) find a strong association with natural resource 
abundance and rent seeking behavior.39 They also find that the extent of corruption relies mainly 
on natural resource abundance, governmental policies, and how bureaucratic power is 
concentrated.40 They also measure corruption by using corruption scores provided by the 
International Country Risk Guide.41 Their natural resource measure is given as the share of 
natural resource exports in a country’s GNP.42 
Finally, I examined a working paper written by Pomona College researcher Cristina 
Waggoner-Nicolescu and co-researcher Shawn Bowler. They specifically look at the impact of 
what they define as “Political Conditionality,” or the conditions attached to trade agreements and 
aid programs the E.U. has with other nations.43 This includes nations who are in the E.U. or in the 
process of joining the EU. They are specifically interested in how these stipulations and conditions 
that the E.U. puts into the agreements, such as election reform or increases in public financial 
transparency, impacts corruption. They look at three different types of association with the EU, 
including Membership, Negotiation, and ENP Action Plan (or European Neighbor Policy). They 
conduct several different regressions with several different types of data. They consistently find 
that the levels of corruption decrease in country when the country holds a conditional offer of E.U. 
                                                          
38 ibid, 11. 
39 Carolos Leite and Jens Weidman, “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic 
Growth,” Working Paper No. 99/85, International Monetary Fund, 1999, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=259928 (Retrieved March 5, 2015). 
40 ibid, 45.  
41 ibid, 46. 
42 ibid, 7. 
43 Christina Nicolescu-Waggonner, and Shaun Bowler, “Corruption in the European Neighbourhood: The Impact of 
E.U. ‘Political Conditionality’ on Governance,” Working Paper, (Academia.edu-Pomona College), 
https://www.academia.edu/1888247/_Corruption_in_Europe_the_Impact_of_EU_political_conditionality_on_gov
ernance_with_Shaun_Bowler_ (Retrieved March 15, 2016). 
membership, contingent on that country insituting certain reforms, but that levels of corruption 
rise again after that country is accepted and officially added to the EU.44  
Waggoner-Nicolescu and Bowler also include demographic binaries for cultural factors, 
such as Catholic, Muslim, or Orthodox, as they cite Treisman when they theorize that some faith 
traditions, such as Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, are more hierarchal and discourage civic 
participation—creating environments conducive to government corruption. They find in several 
of their regressions that both Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy have large effects on increasing 
corruption, both at the 99% significance level.45  
 
III. Methodology  
Data 
The dataset for this paper contains 13 independent variables composed of 6 Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, 4 Global Development Indicators, and 3 demographic binary variables. 
Excepting the 3 demographic variables, all the data for my variables come from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and the World Development Indicators datasets. For 
this study, I used only the countries from the European/Central Asian Region.46  
The World Bank compiles data from a variety of officially recognized and respected 
international sources to generate the Worldwide Governance Indicators, originally developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010).47 According to an official statement released on the 
database website, “[the aggregated indicators] are based on over 30 individual data sources 
                                                          
44 ibid, 17. 
45 ibid, 13.  
46 “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca. 
47 Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and 
Analytical Issues,” Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, (World Bank, September 2010), p 1, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130 (Retrieved November 1, 2015). 
produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, 
international organizations, and private sector firms.48 These sources include Freedom House, 
Transparency International, Global Competitiveness Report, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction, Global Integrity Index, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development 
Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services, the Bertelsman Foundation, 
Reporters Without Borders, and the Commercial Business Information Providers.49 The data 
from these sources are treated using a statistical technique known as Unobserved Components 
model to combine the data into standard, comparable units.50  
I also use country demographic variables from the World Development Index. This is the 
primary collection of World Bank data for development and demographic information on 
countries throughout the world.51 This database includes a variety of indices on national and 
regional financial, commercial, population, and environmental characteristics.52  
Data Cleaning 
There were 855 initial observations in 54 European and Central Asian countries initially 
included in the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset. This number, however, later reduced 
to 372 observations of 31 countries after countries were dropped due to missing or insufficient 
data.  
 
                                                          
48 ibid, 5.  
49 ibid, 8. 
50 ibid, 7. 
51 “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, Retrieved October 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators.  
52 ibid.  
Variables 
These units of data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators are then sorted into six 
broad governance categories (or variables) known as Voice and Accountability (renamed Free 
Press in this study), Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (renamed Political 
Stability), Government Effectiveness (renamed Effective Governance), Regulatory Quality, Rule 
of Law, and Control of Corruption.53 
The Control of Corruption variable is my dependent variable. Control of Corruption 
measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Control of Corruption 
encompasses a range of corrupt activities, as well as the event of “capture” of the state by private 
interests.54 This variable is a 5-point scale whose scores range roughly from -2.5 (indicating most 
corrupt) to 2.5 (indicating least corrupt) with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For 
reference, Finland’s 2012 score was 2.55, indicating a very low level of corruption. Georgia’s 
control of corruption score in 2002, conversely, was -1.13. This indicates a very high level of 
corruption.  
EU Member is my key independent variable. E.U. Member is a binary variable where the 
value of E.U. Member is 1 if the country was a member of the European Union for that year and 
0 if the country was not member of the E.U. for that year. 
From the World Development Indicators dataset, I incorporated data for the factors of 
Urban Population and the Percent of Natural Resources Rents of GDP. While Wijaynato did not 
                                                          
53 Kaufman, et al “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” 1.  
54 ibid, 4. 
find Urban Population to be significant, I included this variable in the study due to the variation 
in urban demographics among European countries.  
Finally, I included certain cultural demographic variables for religious traditions in 
European countries. I am very intrigued by the results found by Waggonner-Nicolescu and 
Bowler, and I am interested gauging the impact of historically Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox 
Christian traditions. These cultural variables are binaries, with the Islamic variable left out. For 














Variable Source Description 
Control of Corruption WGI55 Score, indicating the control corruption in each 
country, ranging from -2.5 (most corrupt) 
to +2.5 (least corrupt). 
EU Member European  
Commission56 
Binary, indicating 0 if not an E.U. member for respective 
year and 1 if an E.U. member in that year    
Effective Governance WGI Score, indicating effectiveness of governmental operation, 
ranging from -2.5 (very ineffective) to +2.5 (very effective) 
Political Stability WGI Score, indicating political stability, ranging from -2.5 (very 
unstable) to +2.5 (very stable) 
Regulation Quality WGI Score, indicating the quality of regulation in the 
country ranging from -2.5 (lowest quality) 
to +2.5 (highest quality) 
Rule of Law WGI Score, indicating the quality of justice system, ranging from 
-2.5 (low quality) to +2.5 (high quality) 
Freedom of Press WGI Score, indicating freedom of speech and freedom of press, 
ranging from -2.5 (not very free) to +2.5 (very free) 
GDP per Capita WDI57 Indicates the GDP per Capita for a Country per year 
Unemployment Rate WDI Indicates the ratio between the unemployed and employed 
populations of labor force per country per year 
Nat Resource GDP WDI The ratio between rents from natural resources 
(i.e. oil, gas, mineral, other resources ) and other activity to 
a country’s total GDP. 
Urban Population WDI Indicates the fraction of the country’s population that lives 
in an Urban Area. 
Catholic CIA World 
Factbook58 
Binary, indicating 1 if country is a Historically Catholic 
Country and 0 if not. 
Protestant CIA World 
Factbook 
Binary, indicating 1 if country is a Historically Protestant 
Country and 0 if not. 
Orthodox CIA World 
Factbook 
Binary, indicating 1 if country is a Historically Orthodox 
Country and 0 if not. 
   
                                                          
55 “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” World Bank, Retrieved October 15, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
56 “EU Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations,” E.U. Commission. Retrieved December 1, 2015. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm 
57 “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, Retrieved October 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
58 “World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, Retrieved December 1, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 
Countries 
This study incorporates thirty-one countries in Europe and Central Asia from 2002 to 
2013. The countries include fourteen countries who were E.U. members at the onset of the study, 
nine countries who join the E.U. during the course of the study,59 and seven countries that are not 
E.U. members.60 Of the nine countries that join the E.U. during the study, six countries were 
added during the 2004 enlargement of the EU,61 two countries were added from the 2007 









                                                          
59 Countries who were already E.U. members at the onset of this study included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. 
60 Non-EU Members included Iceland, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Switzerland, Russia, and Ukraine. 
61 The members of this study in the 2004 Enlargement included Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
62 Members of this study in the 2007 Enlargement included Bulgaria and Romania. 
63 The 2013 Enlargement added Croatia to the EU. The latest information on country association status with the E.U. 









Table 2 details the summary statistics of my variables.  
Table 2. 
Variable Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Corruption 0.623655 1.064515 -1.138725 2.552692 
EU Member 0.9316476 0.4851205 0 1 
Effective Governance 1.020473 0.8778297 -0.8864411    2.356591 
Political Stability 0.5940804 0.6797157 -1.46215    1.664877 
Regulation Quality 1.033927 0.6784107 -0.81443    1.920921 
Rule of Law 0.9232398 0.9077001 -1.167023 1.99964 
Freedom of Press 0.9624432 0.6625328 -1.013167 1.82637 
GDP per Capita 28186.15 20995.02 670.1845 86129.38 
Unemployment Rate 9.053983 6.084385 2.3 37.3 
Nat Resource GDP 2.65139 5.878833 0 39.1455 
Urban Population 71.38512 12.57945 44.857 97.776 
Catholic 0.5215054 0.5002101 0 1 
Protestant 0.2580645 0.438159 0 1 
Orthodox  0.2190645 0.438159 0 1 
No. of Observations 372    
 
The mean for E.U. Member is 0.93, which shows that 93% of the countries in the sample 
were E.U. members or became E.U. members during the selected time range and demonstrated a 
standard deviation of 0.4851.  
My average Control of Corruption score is 0.623655, meaning that the countries in my 
sample from 2002 to 2013 leaned slightly less corrupt on average.  
Model 
 I included regional-level fixed effects into my model in order to account for unobservable 
heterogeneity between different regions across time. For the purposes of this study, these regions 
are defined as Northwest, Mediterranean, Eastern, and Other.  
Building on the model developed by Wijaynato, I thus estimate my model to observe the 
effect membership in the E.U. has on levels of corruption within a country. The basic 
specification for the model is as follows: 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝐄𝐔_𝐌𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐭  + 𝛃𝟐𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭_𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 
                                                         𝛃𝟑𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐭 +  𝛃𝟒𝐅𝐫𝐞𝐞_𝐒𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟓 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐢𝐭 +
                                                         𝛃𝟔𝐆𝐃𝐏_𝐩𝐞𝐫_𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟕𝐑𝐮𝐥𝐞_𝐨𝐟_𝐋𝐚𝐰𝐢𝐭 +
                                                         𝛃𝟖𝐔𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐲𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐭 +  𝛃𝟗𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐢𝐭 +
                                                         𝜷𝟏𝟎𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐭_𝐔𝐫𝐛𝐚𝐧_𝐏𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐭_𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐥_𝐑𝐞𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬_𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐢𝐭 +
                                                         𝜷𝟏𝟐𝐇𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲_𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭𝒊 +





Table 3 summarizes the regression results.  
Table 3. 
Variable Coefficient St. Error (Robust) P-Value 
EU Member -0.1087836*** 0.0335655 0.001 
Effective Governance 0.5391492*** 0.0580785 0.000 
Political Stability -0.0667007** 0.0350888 0.058 
Regulation Quality 0.017878 0.0640482 0.780 
Rule of Law 0.4197714*** 0.074219 0.000 
Freedom of Press 0.0552318 0.072617 0.447 
GDP per Capita 7.74e-06*** 1.31e-06      0.000 
Unemployment Rate -0.000955    0.0020959     0.649 
Nat. Resource GDP -0.0094065***  0.0026768     0.000 
Urban Population   -0.0022343    0.0013693     0.104 
Catholic -0.0223395    0.0400301     0.577 
Protestant 0.3214475*** 0.0443816      0.000 
Orthodox 0.00603    0.0615436      0.922 
No. of Observations 372   
R Squared 0.9698   
Adj. R Squared 0.9685   
***Significant at the 99% Level, **Significant at the 95% Level, *Significant at the 90% Level 
I find that E.U. Membership does impact the level of corruption, and is statistically 
significant at the 99% level. The E.U. Membership variable magnitude of -0.108 indicates that 
membership in the E.U. will decrease a country’s Corruption score by roughly 0.11 points. While 
this value may seem small, this is actually a much larger effect in the context of the possible 5-
point score range (from -2.5 to 2.5).  
I was expecting E.U. Membership to have a negligible impact on the Control of 
Corruption. The negative effect may be due to the situation referenced by Cecilia Malmström in 
which she claims that while member countries have the correct practices and institutions in 
place, these anti-corruption measures are not being effectively utilized to actually combat 
corruption. Prospective countries may create “surface-level” changes during the admission 
process into the EU, but fail to actually address and decrease corruption. 
As expected, the Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law variables both had positive effects 
on Corruption scores and were statistically significant at the 99% level. Additionally, both had 
meaningful magnitudes which were moderately large. Both of these results indicate that higher 
levels of Effective Governance and Rule of Law are associated with moderately higher Control 
of Corruption scores. 
The GDP per Capita variable was both positive and statistically significant at the 99% 
level. However, GDP per Capita had a small magnitude, indicating that a higher GDP per Capita 
is associated with a slighter higher Control of Corruption score.  
While the magnitude is small, Nat Resources per GDP has a negative effect that is 
significant at the 99% level. This is unsurprising and consistent with the literature.  
Contrary to my expectations, my results indicated that the Quality of Regulation and Free 
Press variables were not statistically significant. While the literature indicates that these typically 
have significantly effect on reducing levels of corruption in a country, my model does not 
demonstrate this. I was also surprised to see that Political Stability had a negative effect on a 
country’s corruption score that was significant at the 90% level.  
Interestingly, Historically Protestant has a large effect with a 99% level of significance. 
This is consistent with the literature, particularly Treisman and others. It is important to note, 
however, that this study encompasses a relatively short period in recent history. Thus, I cannot 
conclude that a Protestant tradition is always associated with lower corruption.  
I was unable to obtain data for certain likely important variables, such as salaries of public 
employees. Additionally, there are certain issues involved in gauging corruption, as there is 
discrepancy between what some cultures consider traditional and obligatory exchanges and what 
other cultures consider corrupt practices. This may have resulted in some bias due to missing data. 
The regression results indicate a very high R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared. This is due to 
the fact that my variables are very general and encompass a lot of factors, which is resulting in a 
very high Adjusted R-Squared. Furthermore, including regional-level fixed effects in a study with 
country-level data will typically lead to a very high R-squared. 
Additionally, many of these variables are quite abstract and are highly correlated with 
eachother. This model thus contains a high degree of multicolinearity, especially among the 6 




I aim to develop the sophistication of this study in a few ways. Firstly, I would like to include 
data on ethnic diversity per country, as there is research indicating that level of ethnic diversity 
can increase corruption levels. I would also include data on Black Market premiums to gauge the 
level of Black Market activity in each country.   
Given the high degree of multicolinearity in my model, I think it would be expedient to include 
a correlation matrix to ascertain the degree to which the six Worldwide Governance Indicators are 
correlated with each other and the other variables.  
Additionally, I am interested in running this regression with country-level fixed effects to 
absorb unobservable heterogeneity between the different countries over time. These fixed effects 
would account for the differences that exist between these countries that are missing in my model 
due to the observations I had to drop. I did not include country-level fixed effects as this would 
have consumed too many of my degrees of freedom.  
Finally, I would like to address the largest problem my paper has–the lack of data that forced 
me to remove several countries, particularly Mediterranean and Southeastern European states, 
from my study. I would like to conduct an analysis to determine the effect of the missing 
observations on my model. I will do this by creating a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the 
observation for said country in said year is present, and 0 if this observation is missing. Should the 
missing data prove to be significant, it will mean that this missing data is skewing my results and 
the effect of my key variable.  
The Greek Debt Crises created reverberations across the globe and impacted countries and 
financial institutions all over the world. As the debt crisis manifested in other countries, it became 
evident that the European Union had several problems that it needed to address. Corruption, a 
problem which played a significant role in Europe's financial issues, continues to negatively affect 
the E.U. economy today. As evidenced by my results, it appears that European Union Membership 
is associated with higher levels of corruption in a country. Commissioner Malmström was correct 
in stating that the E.U. needs to re-examine the process by which prospective member countries 
create and adopt anti-corruption measures. Additionally, it appears that current E.U. member 
nations need to scrutinize the efficacy of the anti-corruption legislation, practices, and institutions 
that are already in place. Ultimately, the European Union member states and prospective members 
may need to adopt new and effective ways to address this issue if they are going to effectively 
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